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In this paper we propose an alternative explanation for the nature, sources and consequences 
of inflation rate differentials in a monetary union, such as EMU. To achieve this, we build on 
the new neoclassical synthesis (NNS) framework, recently advanced by Goodfriend (2002) 
and Goodfriend and King (2000). Based on the NNS setup, we discuss the inflationary 
consequences of the catching-up process in a heterogeneous monetary union. In particular, we 
explore the interaction between catching-up and inflation differentials and offer an 
interpretation of the nature of this interaction. Our discussion is in stark contrast to the 
conventional Balassa-Samuelson (BS) interpretation. In particular, we demonstrate that 
divergent inflation rates between Member States do not necessarily have to be an equilibrium 
phenomenon, even if the original shock comes from the supply-side of the economy. Second, 
we show how a centralized monetary policy may produce such divergence of individual 
country’s inflation rates when countries differ in size and in trend productivity growth. 
Against this background, we additionally show how the catching may potentially lead to 
unsustainable credit booms in a catching-up member country. Finally, we indicate some 
important deficiencies of the BS model as a guide to short- and medium-run policy making 
analysis. 
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1.  Introduction 
Inflation  differentials  between  the  European  Union  (EU)  Member  States  participating  in 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have widened since the introduction of the single currency, 
the high point of the convergence process. For example, the spread between the highest and lowest 
inflation rate, which had been about 0.6 percentage points in January 1998, increased to around 3.4 
percentage points in 2000 and reached almost 4.0 percentage points in February 2003. It stabilized 
thereafter and in July 2005 it stood at 3.1 percentage points. It is true that the convergence of 
inflation rates in the late 90s resulted from a deliberate policy action of member states aimed at 
meeting the Maastricht inflation criterion in the run-up to EMU, but still the inflation differentials 
observed thereafter are more regionally persistent than in the US economy and higher than had been 
predicted by some leading commentators (see, for example, De Grauwe (1992) and Canzoneri et al 
(1996)). The inclusion of the EU accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU 
has  produced  a  more  heterogeneous  grouping  of  countries  and  will  presumably  result  in  such 
inflation differentials and their persistence rising even further. Therefore a pertinent policy question, 
that both the current and future EMU members face, is: what is the nature and what are the sources 
and consequences of the observed divergence in inflation rates within the EMU? In particular, does 
this divergence represent an equilibrium adjustment of relative prices, which should not be a source 
of concern, or is it, rather, a sign of rising disequilibrium stimulated by the common one-size-fits-all 
monetary policy? If the latter interpretation is correct it may have important policy implications for 
the euro area.  
A common explanation of the observed divergence in inflation rates within the EU draws on 
the Balassa-Samuelson model (see Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964); for a formalization of the 
model see, for example, De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf, (1994) or Froot and Rogoff, (1995)). In 
this framework inflation differentials emanate from the supply-side during the catching-up process: 
with a constant nominal exchange rate, a positive shock to total factor productivity in the traded   3 
sector raises the average wage in the economy, and thus both the relative price of non-traded to 
traded goods and the inflation rate rise. In this setup, inflationary pressures are not viewed as a 
source of concern as they are an equilibrium, productivity-driven, phenomenon that is unlikely to 
have a deleterious effect on competitiveness and growth.   
The above hypothesis, although widely accepted in the profession (for criticisms see for 
example Bergin et al. (2004) and Podkaminer (2003)), does not seem to be supported by the recent 
experience in the EU. For example, and as we have noted, the inflation rate spread in EMU has been 
continuously increasing since its inception, although trend productivity growth rates in Member 
States have not experienced any major change during that time and, of course, exchange rates have 
been  irrevocably  fixed.  With  the  trend  productivity  growth  and  exchange  rates  constant  across 
Member States, the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) hypothesis predicts that the inflation spread should 
have  stayed  constant,  if  this  hypothesis  were  in  fact  the  main  driving  force  behind  inflation 
developments in EMU.  The fact that the spread has been non-constant suggests that there must be 
other factors at work. 
In this paper we propose an alternative explanation for the nature, sources and consequences 
of inflation rate differentials in a heterogeneous monetary union such as the EMU. Our alternative 
explanation  is  based  on  the  new  neoclassical  synthesis  (NNS)  framework,  as  proposed  by 
Goodfriend (2002) and Goodfriend and King (2000). Our discussion is in sharp contrast to the 
conventional BS interpretation. In particular, we demonstrate that divergent inflation rates between 
Member States do not necessarily have to be an equilibrium phenomenon, even if the original shock 
comes from the supply-side of the economy. Second, we show how a centralized monetary policy 
may incite such divergence of individual country’s inflation rates when countries differ in size and 
in trend productivity growth. Using this framework, we additionally show how it may potentially 
lead to unsustainable credit booms in a small catching-up member country. The issue of credit 
booms  and  boom-bust  cycles  has  recently  gained  a  central  place  in  the  policy  and  academic   4 
discussions regarding the full monetary integration of the new EU Member States from Eastern and 
Central Europe with EMU
1 and in this paper we contribute to this literature by proposing a simple 
framework to understand the potential nature and sources of such credit booms in a monetary union 
with catch-up. Furthermore, we indicate some important deficiencies of the BS model as a guide for 
short- and medium-run policy making analysis. Additionally, we show how standard estimates of 
the  productivity  –  inflation  relationship  can  potentially  produce  an  upward  bias  in  the  point 
estimates of the BS effect. 
The effect we focus on here paper is essentially a demand side phenomenon, albeit one 
which starts from a supply side shock. The influence of demand, of both the public and private 
sector, on inflation and the internal price ratio has, of course, previously been highlighted in a 
number of papers (see for example Dornbusch (1988), Neary (1988) and Bergstrand (1991)). The 
latter formalizes a proposition by Linder (1961) that per capita income is likely to be the most 
important single determinant of the demand structure within a country. The main idea is that as a 
country  catches  up,  and  income  rises,  demand-side  factors  can  affect  the  internal  price  ratio  if 
preferences  are  nonhomothetic;  usually  preferences  are  thought  to  be  biased  in  favor  of  the 
nontraded good because services are viewed as superior goods.  
Our discussion of the effect of demand shocks is different to that considered previously in 
the  literature,  as  it  starts  from  a  supply  side  shock.  In  particular,  we  focus  on  the  role  of 
consumption smoothing in driving inflation differentials. We also explicitly consider the case of a 
monetary and, in particular, a heterogeneous monetary union, which allows us to address issues 
relevant for stabilization policy in a monetary union, like the EMU. 
 It is important to stress at the outset that our approach is rather rudimentary in the sense that 
we take an existing model, namely the NNS, and use it to interpret inflation differentials in the 
context of a heterogeneous monetary union such as the EMU. While our analysis delivers, we 
                                                 
1 See for example,  IMF (2004), Cottareli (2003),    5 
believe,  interesting new insights into the working of EMU, it clearly could be improved on in 
various ways and we hope our work will spur such further research. Therefore throughout the text, 
we indicate potential ways in which such improvements can be made. The outline of the reminder 
of the paper is as follows. The next section sets the scene with a description of the new neoclassical 
synthesis modeling framework. Section 3 presents our discussion of the NSS framework in the 
context of a monetary union – this section is central to the policy conclusions of the paper. Section 4 
concludes and indicates avenues for further research 
 
2. A Sketch of the New Neoclassical Synthesis Model
2 
In  this  section  we  discuss  some  of  the  key  features  of  the  benchmark  new  neoclassical 
synthesis model of Goodfriend (2002). The model incorporates classical features, such as a real 
business cycle (RBC) component, and Keynesian features, such as monopolistically competitive 
firms with sticky prices. In particular, the model behaves like the flexible price RBC model on 
average, but with some possibility for deviations of actual output from potential output in the short 
run,  and  thus  some  room  for  monetary  policy  to  influence  aggregate  demand  and  stabilize 
employment and inflation. Since the basic structure of this class of model is now well known, we 
focus on certain key relationships which are relevant to the key objectives of our paper, leaving a 
complete account of the model to the appendix. 
2. 1. The flexible price variant  
The model is set up for a single country, i, and the representative household maximizes 
consumption subject to a standard budget constraint. With a log utility consumption function, the 
households´ utility from lifetime consumption is maximized (that is, the optimal consumption plan 
is obtained), when the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of transformation: 
                                                 
2 See Goodfriend (2002).   6 
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where c1 and c2 represent the marginal utility from consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively, r is 
the real interest rate and  i r  is the subjective discount or time-preference factor (see the appendix 
for a full discussion). 
The household allocates time between leisure and work and the household gets direct utility 
from leisure and indirectly from earning a wage and using the wage to buy consumption goods
3. 
Assuming  log  utility  functions  for  leisure  and  consumption  it  can  be  demonstrated  that  the 
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where n
s denotes labour supply and w is the real wage. 
In each country there are assumed to be a large number of monopolistically competitive 
firms so that each firm can sustain a price above the marginal cost of production. Firms adjust their 
prices to maintain the profit maximizing markup of price over marginal cost, * m , at all times and 
the profit maximizing markup is invariant to shifts in demand or in the cost of production. With a 
Cobb Douglas production technology it can be demonstrated that the first order condition for the 
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where (1/a) is the hours of work needed to produce one unit of consumption, w is the real wage 
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3 The hourly wage buys w units of consumption and the household values the additional w units of consumption at 
u’(c)=1/c. So, the household ears w/c units of utility by working an hour instead of taking leisure.    7 
Furthermore, the equilibrium employment, n*, and the equilibrium output, c*, in each country can 
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Thus, the equilibrium employment n*, in the flexible price RBC model depends only on the profit 
maximizing markup 
* m  and does not fluctuate with productivity, a
4, whereas output, c*, grows and 
fluctuates  proportionally  with  productivity  a.  By  substituting  the  current  and  future  supply  of 
consumption goods ( * 1 c * 2 c ) into the optimal lifetime consumption plan 1) an expression for the 
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From expression 7) we see that the real equilibrium interest rate varies directly with the growth of 
labor productivity, as in standard neoclassical growth theory models. The driving force for this is 
the existence of the life time consumption plan and the consumption smoothing of a representative 
agent. For example, when future productivity is expected to be higher than current productivity 
) ( 2 1 a a < , households will want to borrow against their brighter future income prospects to bring 
some consumption forward in time. As they smooth consumption and borrow against the future, 
households drive up the real interest rate to the point where they are satisfied with the steeply sloped 
consumption plan that matches the growth of productivity. Hence, the real equilibrium interest rate 
clears the economy-wide goods market by inducing the representative household to spend exactly 
                                                 
4 The reason is that productivity a affects consumption c and the real wage w proportionally given hours worked n.   8 
the amount of its current income; demand matches supply and the economy is in equilibrium with 
stable inflation.  
 
2.2. The NNS with sticky prices 
  Relaxing  the  assumption  that  firms  constantly  adjust  prices  to  maintain  the  profit 
maximizing markup, allows aggregate demand to generate short-term fluctuations in employment 
and  output.  In  the  presence  of  menu  costs,  it  is  costly  for  a  firm  to  change  its  product  price. 
Consequently, a firm decides to change the price of its product to restore the profit maximizing 
markup only when demand or cost conditions move the actual markup persistently away from the 
profit maximizing markup. If a firm expects the shock to the markup to be temporary it will not 
change its price to restore the profit maximizing markup. Given this behaviour, we can write the 
following inflation function: 
p m m p E E INF + = ) , ( 2 1                    8) 
where  p E  is the expected rate of inflation, and  ) , ( 2 1 m m E INF  is a function indicating the effect of 
the current and expected future markup on inflation. When the current and expected future markup 
are equal, the profit maximizing markup is zero,  0 ) , ( =
* * m m INF , and firms move their prices in 
accordance  with  expected  inflation,  p E ,  as  in  the  flex-price  variant  of  the  model.  Markup 
compression  ) (
* < m m  moves actual inflation above expected inflation whereas markup expansion 
) (
* > m m  moves actual inflation below expected inflation.  
Stickiness  of  prices  means  that  current  employment  and  output  are  determined  by  the 
aggregate demand for goods. This outcome is central to the new neoclassical synthesis: although 
firms maintain the profit maximizing markup on average over time, so that the NSS model behaves 
like the flexible price RBC model on average, there is nonetheless some scope for monetary policy 
to influence aggregate demand and stabilize employment and inflation in the short-run.  
   9 
2.3. The central bank reaction function  
 The central bank’s policy actions may be described in the following way, for one of the 
countries. The central bank implements monetary policy a short-term target interest rate,R  For 
simplicity we assume that expected inflation  0 ) ( = p E , and the central bank’s nominal interest rate 
target,  R ,  translates  into  a  certain  target  for  the  real  interest  rate,  r .  Furthermore,  the  public 
expects future markups to be at their profit maximizing level, 
*
2) ( m m = E , and current and future 
productivity  ) , ( 2 1 a a  are given by technology and independently of interest policy, so that from 6) 
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Expression  9)  reveals  the  way  interest  rate  policy  influences  aggregate  demand:  current 
consumption  1 c   is  inversely  related  to  the  real  interest  rate  target,  r ,  when  expected  future 
consumption is anchored at  * 2 1
1
m +
a . An increase in the real interest rate target depresses current 
aggregate  demand  by  raising  the  opportunity  cost  of  current  consumption  in  terms  of  future 
consumption.  The  contraction  in  aggregate  demand  is  reflected,  in  turn,  in  reduced  current 
employment, 1 n , a low current real wage,  1 w , and an expanded current markup  1 m . Conversely, a 
cut in the real interest rate target expands current aggregate demand, raises the real wage, and 
compresses the markup.  
   10 
2.4. An example of catching-up and the role of central bank 
  In  this  section  we  consider  an  example  of  catching-up,  in  terms  of  a  shift  in  trend 
productivity growth,
5 in the context of the NNS model and, in particular, consider the central banks 
reaction  to  this  shock.  With  such  a  shock,  current  and  future  productivity  are  related 
by 1 2 ) 1 ( a g a + =  , where  g  is the trend growth rate and current productivity, 1 a , is taken as given. 
Assuming  that  the  interest  rate  policy  is  expected  to  keep  the  actual  markup  at  the  profit 
maximizing markup in the future, 
* = m m2  , future income prospects will vary directly with the 
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Using conditions A2) and A3) and setting  1 1 c y =  (current income is demand determined when 
prices are sticky), we can solve for current aggregate consumption, 1 c , in terms of  future income 










.                    11) 
  By substituting  2 y from 10) into 11) we see that - holding r constant - a household transmits 
higher future income induced by an increase in trend productivity growth to current consumption, 
employment and output. In other words, households smooth consumption by borrowing in the credit 
market as they want to allocate any expected change in lifetime resources to both current and future 
consumption.  
From this example we see that a positive shock to trend productivity growth is inflationary: 
an increase in current aggregate demand raises the real wage and compresses the markup due to an 
increased demand for labor. However, the central bank can stabilize the economy by moving its real 
interest rate target proportionately with the growth rate,g (and thus real equilibrium interest rate,   11 
* r ;  substitute  1 ) 1 ( a g +   for  2 a   in  7).  The  higher  real  interest  rate  target  gives  households  an 
incentive not to consume expected resources prematurely. In other words, in order to stabilize the 
economy the central bank has to “cut off” consumption smoothing by raising its real interest rate 
target, r .   This result will be central to our subsequent policy analysis.  
 
3. An interpretation of the NNS model in the context of a monetary union 
Now consider the case where country i decides to form a monetary union with country j, 
where the two countries establish a common central bank that is responsible for the price stability in 
the whole currency area and uses a short term interest rate as its monetary policy instrument
6. The 
representative agent in country j faces a similar maximizing problem to that considered in the last 
section.  
The  lifetime  budget  constraint  for  the  whole  currency  area  is  composed  of  a  weighed 
average of the budget constraints of the household from country i and j.  
)]
) 1 (
)( 1 ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( )]
) 1 (


















y r C r
r
y
y r C r C
+
+ + + + - - +
+
+ + + + - = a a ,  12) 
where the parameter a denotes the share of country-i’  household’s lifetime budget constraint in that 
of the whole currency area. For concreteness, a represents i-country’s economic size, measured by 
its share in the GDP of the whole monetary area.  
In the monetary union, monetary policy is set by a central monetary authority, a common 
central bank, whose sole objective is to stabilize a certain weighted average inflation rate for the 
whole currency area (in the context of the euro area this would be the HICP). The common central 
bank  implements  monetary  policy  using  a  nominal  short-term  interest  rate  policy  instrument 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Although it is possible to use the NSS to analyse a variety of shocks, in this paper we focus only on productivity 
shocks, as they are the most relevant for our purposes. For more details see Goodfriend (2002). 
6 In what follows we assume that when the two countries form the monetary union the combined economic area is 
closed. This is clearly unrealistic and means we ignore other reasons for inflation differentials in a monetary union, such 
as those which stem from having a common external exchange rate (see, for example, Honohan and Lane (2003)). 
However, our approach does help to highlight what we believe is the key source of inflation differentials in EMU.   12 
(nominal interest rate target) which translates directly into a certain target of a weighted average 
real interest rate (for the whole currency area) that is consistent with the price stability objective of 
the central bank (currency area-wide inflation rate). Note, however, that - exactly as in EMU – 
individual  country  inflation  rates,  and  therefore  actual  real  long-term  interest  rates,  may  differ 
across the two countries. The nominal interest rate target is, in turn, equal for all member countries. 
Member countries´ real equilibrium long-term interest rates are then determined by the productivity 
growth path in each country, as in equation 7). The nominal interest rate target is set according to a 
response function of the common central bank, where the change of the interest rate instrument is a 
weighted average of the change in equilibrium interest rates in both countries. 
 
3. 1. Homogenous monetary union and productivity shocks 
In  this  section  we  consider  the  impact  of  productivity  shocks  in  the  context  of  a 
homogeneous, or symmetrical, monetary union. A homogeneous monetary union is one in which 
both Member States of the monetary union are exactly the same in terms of the parameters of their 
economies, in particular in terms of their productivity growth rates in period 1 and 2. Thus, both 
countries face exactly the same equilibrium interest rate,  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* * + = + j i r r . The target real interest 
rate  r  for the monetary union that is consistent with the stability objective of the common central 
bank is now a weighted average of each individual country’s real equilibrium interest rates  ) 1 (
* + i r  
and  ) 1 (
* + j r  and we can think of this as the reaction function of the common central bank:  
) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* * + - + + = + j i r r r a a ,                13) 
where again, a, represents the i country’s economic size in terms of its share of the GDP of the 
whole currency area. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Developing the NNS model into a two-country open economy model would allow making the point in a more rigorous 
manner and should be the subject of further research.      13 
As in the single country example given above, we assume that the central bank has control 
over  the  common  weighted  average  real  interest  rate  r   via  its  (common)  instrument  nominal 
interest rate R , so that  
R r = .                       14)  
Before proceeding further it is important to explain the relationship between the interest 
rates,  ) , (
* *
j i r r ,  ) , ( j i r r ,  r  and  R .  R  is the nominal short-term interest rate policy instrument 
(nominal interest rate target) used by the common central bank to implement monetary policy. In 
the monetary union, the nominal interest rate target is, of course, equal for all member countries. 
The nominal interest target translates directly into,r , i.e. a target real interest rate (for the whole 
currency area) that is consistent with the price stability objective of the central bank (currency area-
wide inflation rate). Specifically,r , is a weighted average of  equilibrium interest rates in both 
countries (with weights being the shares of each country in the GDP of the whole currency area). 
Importantly,  r  stabilizes the currency area as a whole but not necessarily each individual member 
country.  Furthermore,  ) , (
* *
j i r r  are the member countries´ real equilibrium long-term interest rates 
that are country specific and are determined by the productivity growth paths in each country. From 
13) we see that if the share of country j is very small,  0 ) 1 ( ® -a ,  the jth country cannot influence 
the common real interest rate and this is consistent with the standard assumption that a small open 
economy cannot influence the world interest rate. Finally,  ) , ( j i r r  are the actual real long-term 
interest rates in each country. Exactly as in EMU, they may differ across member states, due, for 
example, to the existence of a risk premium, e.g. default risk
7 (as well as due to differences in 
individual country inflation rates). For concreteness, with inflation given, we can write that:  
i i r r s + = ,                      15) 
                                                 
7 We assume that that fixing of the bilateral exchange rates within the monetary union is fully credible, there is not 
exchange rate risk.     14 
j j r r s + = ,                      15´) 
where s  is a default risk term which is assumed to be a function of debt-to-GDP ratio,d , such that 
) (d f s = ,                      16)  
where the default risk is an increasing function of d , so that  0 ) ( ' > d f . 
 Importantly, from 13) we can also see that – abstracting from default risk -  r  can diverge 
from 
*
i r  or 
*
j r , the interest rates required to preserve economic stability in a given country – this 
constitutes the fundamental challenge for the common monetary policy of the whole currency area. 
Only if the productivity path is exactly the same in both countries, i.e. 
*
i r = 
*
j r  ,  is the common real 
interest rate target exactly at the level that both countries would need, and r =
*
i r = 
*
j r .  
Given the above, and as long as both countries creating the monetary union are exactly the 
same in terms of productivity in both periods (as well as time preference  r ), the real interest target 
would coincide with the interest rates that both countries would face  had they  not formed the 
monetary union. Also, if both countries are hit by a symmetric productivity shock such as the one 
analyzed in section 2, the central bank reaction will be the same as if the monetary union were a 
single country and the nominal interest rate target  R  will have to be increased proportionately to 
the  increase  in  the  productivity  growth  rate.  However,  executing  monetary  policy  in  a 
heterogeneous monetary union is more complicated, as we now demonstrate.    
 
3.2.  Heterogeneous  monetary  union  and  productivity  shocks:  implications  for  inflation 
differentials and credit booms 
A  heterogeneous  monetary  union  has  two  aspects:  differences  in  growth  rates  and 
differences  in  economic  size  between  the  members  of  the  union.  It  is  important  to  note  that 
stabilization issues arise only when both conditions are not met simultaneously. For example, if 
growth rates in both member countries are exactly the same, the monetary union behaves like a 
symmetric union and no stabilization issues arise - the economic size of the countries does not   15 
matter in this situation. The latter condition is thus necessary but not sufficient for heterogeneity 
being a potentially complicating factor in the conduct of monetary policy in the currency area.  
In  this  paper  we  consider  a  heterogeneous  monetary  union  in  a  form  that  very  much 
resembles EMU. The union consists of two countries, a big “core” country and a small “periphery” 
country. The “core” country is a productivity laggard, whereas the “periphery” is a catching-up 
country, with high trend productivity growth rate. To study this case we first assume that a>(1-a), 
so that economic size of country i is “bigger” than  that of country j. For concreteness, we assume 
that a is substantially higher than (1-a), namely 0.99. In other words the “core” country represents 
99% of the whole common currency area and the periphery country accounts for only 1% of the 
whole area, in terms of their economic size. Although clearly this is not a very good description of 
existing intra-European links in EMU, it is a good description of the size of the current group of 
new EU Member States vis a vis the Euro area (in terms of their GDP levels).  
  Given these weights, it follows from 13) and 14) that  R r =  reacts much more heavily to 
changes in the productivity path in country i than in country j. For all practical purposes country j is 
“forced” to accept the changes in the interest  R r =  that are due to changes in economic conditions 
in country i.  
For example, assume now that country j starts to catch-up, i.e. there is an increase,  g , in 
trend productivity in the small country, j.  Had the country j not participated in the monetary union, 
its central bank would have to increase the interest rate byg ; that is, in proportion to the increase in 
the growth rate. In a monetary union, however, equations 13) and 14) indicate that the common 
central bank would raise its interest rate target by only  g ) 1 ( a - , which is less than the amount ( g ) 
required to stabilize the economy of country j. The common monetary policy therefore fails to 
respond to the productivity shock in the smaller country
8.  
                                                 
8 Note that the above discussion does not mean that prior to monetary union the central bank tries to promote optimal 
consumption smoothing, whereas following monetary union, it pursues price stability. In both cases, price stability is   16 
As a result of this, something akin to a boom-bust cycle may therefore potentially develop in 
the  catching-up  country,  j.  For  example,  in  the  “boom-phase”,  households  in  the  catching-up 
country borrow in the credit market to smooth consumption and actual output deviates from its 
potential, employment and wages rise and the actual mark-up is persistently squeezed below the 
profit  maximizing  mark-up.  If  this  situation  persists,  firms  in  the  catching-up  country  will 
eventually  start  adjusting  their  mark-ups  upwards  to  the  profit  maximizing  level,  stimulating 
additional inflation
9. The inflation differential for the monetary union rises and the real interest rate 
in  the  catching-up  country  falls  (hence,  the  gap  between  the  actual  real  interest  rate  and  the 
equilibrium  interest  rates  widens  even  further).  In  this  case,  however,  the  positive  inflation 
differential in the catching-up  country is not an equilibrium adjustment of relative prices as is 
usually presumed in the Balassa-Samuelson framework, but rather a  result of demand pressure 
driven by consumption smoothing stimulated by the positive productivity shock. Obviously, the 
degree of the inflation differentials between the two countries will depend on the extent to which 
the law of one price holds. In a small and very open economy the inflation differentials may be 
negligible, whereas in a more closed economy, these differentials might be significant. Irrespective 
of the CPI inflation effect, one would expect an increase in the asset price inflation that would fuel 
the boom through the wealth effect. Finally, the structure of the economy will also determine the 
extent to which the demand pressure arising from the consumption smoothing will spill-over onto 
the trade or current account balance. 
In the “bust-phase”, household’s borrowing for consumption smoothing eventually increases 
the debt-to-GDP ratio (additionally, if part of the demand is spent on imports the current account 
position may deteriorate). By virtue of 16), rising debt of the private sector increases the country’s 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the primary objective - promoting optimal consumption smoothing is just the way of achieving this objective in a one-
country case. In a situation of heterogeneous countries who form a monetary union, the common central bank is not in a 
position to achieve optimal consumption smoothing in both countries at the same time, although it can achieve the price 
stability objective for the whole area. The basic point is therefore that while centralized monetary policy works well 
from the perspective of area wide average inflation, it might not be optimal for certain member states. 
9 For this result to hold, there has to be some deviation from PPP.    17 
default risk, d , and thus the real interest rate starts to increase too. This, in turn, leads to both an 
increase of the costs of debt service and a slowdown of GDP growth. Eventually, interest rates will 
rise (and so will the comparative price level) sufficiently to restore equilibrium but it may come at a 
cost of a potential recession or underperformance in the medium-term. The extent of this effect will, 
of course, depend on the degree of flexibility of product and labour markets in a given country. 
  It is crucial to stress that in the above discussion it is implicitly assumed that agents 
do not have perfect foresight. Of course, in the absence of uncertainty the default risk would not rise 
and the country could afford to borrow given the increase in productivity. Departure from this 
assumption is thus necessary for our result to hold. Suppose consumers in the catch-up country 
expect higher productivity and start borrowing against future income. But if - as we suggest in the 
paper - the one-size-fits-all policy entails interest rates which are too low and, as a consequence, 
produce a misallocation of resources, and hence; leads to lower then expected future income in a 
catch-up country, the bust will follow. In this real-world case solvability or sustainability issues 
arises and these will be incorporated into the default risk. 
  
3.3. The Balassa-Samuelson effect – an extra “kick” 
So  far  we  have  assumed  an  economy-wide  productivity  shock  in  country  j  that  caused 
divergence in the trend productivity  growth between the two countries. However, much of the 
traditional discussion of productivity shocks focuses on their sectoral impact.  In particular, the 
standard  Balassa-Samuelson  effect  (BS  effect)  relates  to  the  effects  of  differences  in  trend 
productivity growth between traded and nontraded sectors and between countries. We now add in a 
standard BS effect into our version of the NSS model.  
We assume that the two economies produce traded and nontraded goods using the same 
Cobb-Douglas production technology: 
b b - =
1
t t t t k n a y                      17)   18 
g g - =
1
n n n n k n a y                      17´) 
where  the  terms  have  the  same  definition  as  before,  subscripts  t  and  n,  denote  the  traded  and 
nontraded sectors and b and g indicate the shares of labor in each sector. 
  As in the traditional BS account, we assume that the law of one price holds for tradables (so 
that the price of tradables  t P is equal to one) and the real wage in that sector is determined by the 








a W .                    18) 
   Since labor is mobile between the traded and non-traded sectors, the real wage is equalized 
across sectors as: 
g g












W W .                   19) 
With these assumptions it is then straightforward to demonstrate that a positive shock to 
total factor productivity in the traded sector raises the average wage in the economy, the relative 
price of nontraded to traded goods rises, and the CPI-based real exchange rate appreciates. Hence 
we  have  the  standard  Balassa-Samuelson  prediction  that  there  should  be  a  positive  (negative) 
relationship between total factor productivity in the traded (nontraded) sector and the CPI-based real 
exchange rate. To see this, assume for simplicity that the sectoral elasticities,  b and g , are equal. 
From the above it follows that the relative price,  t n P P P / = , is determined by relative productivities 
between the traded and nontraded sector: 
n t t n a a p p p - = - =
b
g
                   20) 
  Dynamically, a higher productivity growth rate in the traded relative to the non-traded sector 
has – ceteris paribus – an inflationary effect; assuming the law of one price holds, with the tradable 
prices constant, an increase in the relative price of non-tradable to traded goods raises the overall   19 
price  level.  This  productivity-driven  inflation  rate  is  usually  regarded  as  an  equilibrium 
phenomenon,  since  it  simply  reflects  the  normal  adjustment  of  relative  prices  to  productivity 
changes and does not therefore have an adverse effect on either internal or external macroeconomic 
stability.    
  What  consequence  does  the  BS  effect  have  for  our  analysis  of  stabilization  policy  in  a 
heterogeneous  monetary  union  in  the  context  of  the  NSS  framework? To  answer  this  question 
assume  that  the  economy  wide  productivity  shock,  a,  is  a  weighted  average  of  sectoral 
productivities, so that:  
  n t a a a ) 1 ( q q - + = ,                    21) 
where q  is a share of the traded sector in the economy.  
Consider now the case where country j experiences a higher trend productivity growth in its 
traded sector relative to its nontraded sector so that, as before, the economy-wide trend productivity 
growth increases byg . By virtue of 13) and 14), the common central bank raises the interest rate 
target  R  by only  g ) 1 ( a - , which is less than that required to stabilize the economy j. However, 
since the increase of a stems from an increase in the trend productivity growth in the traded sector, 
t a , country j experiences an additional BS effect-driven inflation pressure: according to 20) an 
increase in relative productivity growth causes relative prices to rise. Higher inflation means that the 
actual  real  interest  rate  falls  even  more  and  –  importantly  -  departs  even  further  from  the 
equilibrium interest rate that would be required to stabilize the economy given by expression 7). So 
the BS effect introduces an “extra kick” into the fall in the real interest rate that is generated in the 
base-line version of the NSS model and this creates the kind of demand pressures discussed above. 
In sum the BS effect has two components in our variant of the NSS model: the standard equilibrium 
productivity-driven  component  and  a  demand-side,  consumption-smoothing,  component.  The 
former  is  an  equilibrium  phenomenon  whereas  the  latter  is  viewed  as  an  out-of-equilibrium   20 
phenomenon: from a competitiveness perspective, country j’s comparative price level increases and 
its competitiveness suffers.  
        
Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  proposed  an  alternative  explanation  of  the  nature,  sources  and 
consequences of inflation rate differentials in a monetary union, such as the EMU. In doing so, we 
have built on the new neoclassical synthesis framework, which has recently been advanced by 
Goodfriend (2002) and Goodfriend and King (2000). In general terms, we demonstrate that the 
divergent inflation rates between member states of a monetary union do not necessarily have to be 
an equilibrium phenomenon, even if the original shock comes from the supply-side of the economy. 
We identify consumption-smoothing as the channel for this phenomenon. 
The key message in our paper is that with a one-size-fits-all monetary policy, the current 
group of new EU member states may face a bumpy ride towards full monetary integration with the 
EMU. In particular, we have demonstrated, in the context of an optimizing model, that productivity 
shocks are likely to have a much less benign effect on inflation differentials within the Euro area 
than would be expected on the basis of the traditional Balassa-Samuelson model. This is because in 
a heterogeneous monetary union – one in which the GDP of the catch-up countries is only a small 
proportion  of  the  euro  area  –  the  one-size-fits-all  monetary  policy  will  fail  to  respond  to  the 
productivity growth in the catching up countries thereby imparting an extra layer of demand side 
inflation. The latter, in turn, may create a credit boom which has unpleasant consequences for asset 
price inflation, the debt/GDP ratio in the catch-up countries and also for their unemployment and 
growth rates. The tendency for inflationary differentials to arise in heterogenous monetary unions 
with catch-up, is likely to be exacerbated if there are sectoral productivity differences within the 
‘catch-up’ countries. 
Although  we  have  not  formally  modeled  them  in  our  paper,  our  results  highlight  the 
importance  of  other  policies,  such  as  fiscal  policies  and  financial  market  prudential  regulation   21 
policies, in ensuring the smooth functioning of a heterogeneous monetary union, such as EMU. This 
seems particularly important for the new EU Member States whose desire for full integration with 
the euro area is combined with the prospect of a fast catching-up process and a need for further 
financial deepening of their economies. The link between these policies and the monetary policy in 
a monetary union with catch-up, , would appear to be an important subject for further research 
perhaps using the framework proposed in this paper.  
Given the rudimentary nature of our analysis, our paper should be regarded as a first step in 
using the NNS to analyse monetary unions. In particular, the NNS could be developed in a two-
country  framework  open  economy  setting,  thereby  allowing  for  other  sources  of  inflationary 
differentials. Allowance also for departures from PPP and Fisher equations would also enrich the 
analysis by allowing the mark-up to deviate from its optimal level. Likewise, a formal introduction 
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Appendix 
 
The New Neoclassical Synthesis Approach: Household and Firm Behaviour. 
In  this  appendix  we  present  the  derivation  of  the  key  household  and  firm  equilibrium 
conditions contained in the text. Since the model is symmetric with respect to the home and foreign 
country we focus here only on the household and firm in country i.  
 
Household consumption 
Each  country  contains  a  representative  household  which  maximizes  lifetime  utility, 
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where  ) ( 1
i C U  represent utility from consumption in the present period,  ) ( 2
i C U  is utility from future 
consumption,  i r  is a fixed preference parameter, the subjective discount or time-preference factors 
and  ) , ( 2 1
i i i C C U  is therefore the present discounted values of lifetime utility from consumption. The 
parameters  are  positive,  and  measure  consumers’  impatience  to  consume.  In  other  words, 
consumers favor current consumption over future consumption. As usual, we assume that the period 
utility function  ) (C U  is strictly increasing in consumption and strictly concave:  0 ) ` ( > C U  and 
0 ) ` ` ( < C U . 
The lifetime budget constraint of each household is given by:   
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+   is  the  present  discounted  value  of  lifetime  income  prospects  of  a  representative 
household from the country i , and  ) 1 ( i r +  represents the “marginal rate of transformation” of future 
for  current  consumption.  Equation  (A2)  says  that  the  household’s  lifetime  consumption  cannot 
exceed their lifetime income.  
Assuming  the  utility  function  has  a  log  form,  c C U log ) ( = ,  so  that  c C U / 1 ) ´( = ,  each 
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Equation A3) says that the household values current consumption more highly relative to 
future consumption the more abundant is planned future consumption compared to planned current 
consumption. 
The  households´  utility  from  lifetime  consumption  is  maximized,  i.e.  the  optimal 
consumption plan is obtained, when the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation: 








+ = + r .                    A4) 
 
Household Labor supply  
Each household’s time budget supply is given by: 
1 = + i i n l ,                       A5) 
where, l is time allocated to leisure and n is time allocated to work by each household; the amount 
of time per period is normalized to 1. A household gets direct utility from leisure and indirectly by 
earning a wage and using the wage to buy consumption goods
10.  
Assuming log utility functions for leisure and consumption, the allocation of time in a given 
period which maximizes the household’s utility is that where the marginal utility earned directly 








.                      A6) 
Given A5) and A6), household’s willingness to supply labor is a function of household 





n - =1 .                      A7) 
 
Firms, Employment and Output 
In each country there are a large number of monopolistically competitive firms; i.e. each 
firm is large in its market but small with respect to the whole economy. Firms can sustain a price 
above the marginal cost of production and adjust their prices to maintain the profit maximizing 
markup of price over marginal cost, * m , at all times. The profit maximizing markup is invariant to 
shifts in demand or in the cost of production. 
                                                 
10 The hourly wage buys w units of consumption and the household values the additional w units of consumption at 
u’(c)=1/c. So, the household earns w/c units of utility by working an hour instead of taking leisure.    25 
The production function has a standard Cobb-Douglas form: 
b b - =
1 k an y ,                      A8) 
where y denotes output, and a, n and k stand for productivity, labor and capital. For simplicity we 
assume constant returns to scale and constant capital stock. Furthermore, noting that total output is 
fully  consumed,  we  can  write  production  of  consumption  goods  c  in  each  country  as  being 
generated by using only labor input, n, according to the following, linear, production technology:  
i i i n a c = ,                         A9) 
where  i a  denotes labor productivity in units of consumption goods produced per hour in each 
country. Labor productivity fluctuates and grows over time with technological progress. 





= m ,                      A10) 
where P is the price of a unit of consumption goods, and MC is the marginal cost
11.   
Given that MC is equal to the nominal wage, W times (1/a) hours of work needed to produce 





= m ,                      A11) 
where w is the real wage (W/P).  
 









= ,                      A12) 
where real wage grows and fluctuates directly with productivity 
 
Equilibrium  employment  in  each  country,  n*,  is  determined  by  using  A9)  and  A12)  to 
substitute for c and w in the labor supply function A8). From this we obtain the desired labor supply 









- = ,                    A13) 
and equate it to labor utilized by each country’s firm n, ( n n
s = ), 
                                                 
11 Note, although this is not crucial for the end results, that  i P and  j P may or may not be necessarily equal in 
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Equilibrium output c* in each country is determined from production technology A9) and 





= a ci ,                    A15) 
where output c* grows and fluctuates proportionally with productivity a. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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